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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the relevance of government purchasing behavior for innovation-
based economic growth. We construct a parsimonious Schumpeterian growth model in which 
demand from the public sphere can effectively alter the economy’s rate of technological 
change. We incorporate results of various empirical studies arguing that public sector demand 
acts as incentive for private innovation activities. In contrast to the standard Schumpeterian 
growth framework, we account for industry heterogeneity in terms of innovation potential. 
This extension allows to bring government demand policy within the realm of the growth pol-
icy debate. By varying the composition of its purchases, the government can induce a reallo-
cation of private resources to stimulate the rate of technological change. This comes along 
with temporarily faster economic growth. Moreover, our welfare analysis implies that it is 
always worth implementing a policy in which industries benefit from public purchases subject 
to their specific innovation size.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the influence of government purchasing behavior on innovation ac-
tivity and economic growth within the framework of a Schumpeterian growth model. Long-
run growth results from quality-improving innovation and is, in particular, driven by the tech-
nological composition of government demand. As innovation has been acknowledged to be a 
key determinant of long-run growth, the link between public demand and innovation is also 
relevant for economic growth. This paper is related to the literature emphasizing that market 
demand is one important driver of the rate and direction of technological change, typically 
referred to as “demand pull.” Standard quality ladder models (Grossman & Helpman, 1991a 
and 1991b; Aghion & Howitt, 1992) completely neglect demand-pull effects because these 
authors assume all industries are symmetric with respect to their innovation potential. Relax-
ing the symmetry assumption allows us to explore the effects of a change in the composition 
of public demand spending on the long-run equilibrium and on the economy’s transitional 
dynamics.  
Our main result is that, when government purchases are relatively in favor of indus-
tries with above-average innovation size, the rate of technological change is stimulated. This 
unfolds temporarily higher economic growth. In the long run, however, the growth rate is 
completely determined by exogenous parameters. Both results combined imply that public 
demand policy influences the level of the balanced-growth equilibrium, while leaving the bal-
anced-growth rate unaffected. We further show that government purchasing behavior might 
lead to indeterminacy of equilibria, thus having potential to explain business cycles as well as 
drastically different growth experiences of countries whose initial conditions were very simi-
lar. Finally, as the utility level of individuals provides an appropriate criterion for assessing 
the overall benefits of government policies, we investigate whether economic welfare can be 
raised by a change in the technological content of public demand spending. We find that from 
a normative viewpoint, it is always worth implementing a demand policy in which industries 
benefit from public purchases subject to their specific quality jump.  
The paper suggests that the composition of government demand expenditure is an im-
portant determinant of firms’ innovation activities, thereby contributing to the literature on the 
role of the demand side for innovation. Research in this field highlights a formidable array of 
possible explanations for the rate and the direction of technological change being sensible to 
demand conditions, which can be aggregated to two main grounds. On the one hand, demand 
“steers” firms to address certain problems (Rosenberg, 1969). Sophisticated users who are 
well aware of their needs and able to communicate them to the producers enable interaction 
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between firms and users, leading to a decrease of uncertainty in the innovation process (von 
Hippel, 1982, 1986; Lundvall 1988; Guerzoni, 2007). On the other hand, the size of the pay-
off to successful investment in innovation activities determines their attractiveness for firms. 
In the words of the U.S. sociologist Seabury C. Gilfillan (1935, pp. 58f.): “Increasing popula-
tion and/or industry stimulate invention, because they increase the absolute need for a device, 
and the number of potential finders, while the cost of finding remain the same. There are 
more mouths to eat the innovation, so to speak, and more eyes to find it.” Schmookler (1962, 
1966) uses patent data to show that inventive activity tended to lag behind the peaks and val-
leys of output of a commodity. From this observation it can be inferred that market demand 
forces influence shifts in the allocation of resources to inventive activity. Schmookler (1966, 
p. 206) concludes concisely: “[…] invention is largely an economic activity which, like other 
economic activities, is pursued for gain.”
1 More recently, Gilfillan’s and Schmookler’s find-
ings have been further explored by Acemoglu & Linn (2004) in their study on the emergence 
of new drugs. The authors find that a one percent increase in potential market size for a drug 
category leads to a four to 7.5 percent increase in the number of new drugs in that category 
entering the U.S. market. Thereby only a handful of the 1,400 new drugs approved over the 
last forty years have targeted so-called “tropical” diseases like malaria or tuberculosis, al-
though these diseases are responsible for the death of millions of people every year. 
Following the widespread recognition of the role of demand in affecting both the rate 
and direction of innovation, a stream of literature has emerged that focuses on public demand. 
An early study in this context was Project “HINDSIGHT,” conducted on behalf of the U.S. 
Department of Defense (Sherwin & Isenson, 1967; Rothwell & Zegveld, 1982). A review of 
the development of 710 military innovations led to the key finding that nearly 95 percent of 
the innovations were motivated by a recognized defense need. Ruttan (2006) and Mowery 
(2008) go as far as to suggest that most of the general purpose technologies developed in the 
U.S. in the 20th century either would not have emerged without the impetus from government 
demand, or only with a considerable delay. Fridlund (2000) as well as Berggren & Laestadius 
(2003) attribute the observed major impact of the public sector in Scandinavian countries on 
the development of Nordic telecommunication to so-called “development pairs” defined as a 
                                                 
1 Schmookler’s findings are sometimes interpreted as supporting the statement that the primary stimulus for 
innovation comes from demand on the marketplace rather than being a result of major breakthroughs in science 
(e.g. Gilpin, 1975; Acemoglu & Linn, 2004). However, as Schmookler’s work deals with inventions, not with 
commercially successful innovations, this extension is illegitimate (see also Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979, pp. 
138f.). 
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long-term relation between industry and customers from the public sphere.
2 Moreover, Scan-
dinavian governments often set challenging novelty requirements and insisted on the devel-
opment of technical advances while the respective private counterpart hesitated. Complement-
ing these case study results, quantitative studies of the influence of public demand on innova-
tion typically support the conjecture that the size of public markets can provide an enormous 
stimulus to innovation (Lichtenberg, 1988; Aschhoff & Sofka, 2008). 
Several factors can be identified why government demand might be critical for innova-
tion. First, the total magnitude of government purchasing is considerable. In the U.S., the av-
erage size of public procurement markets
3 amounted to 420 billion USD in the fiscal year 
2006, which is equivalent to about 4.5 percent of U.S. GDP (Federal Procurement Data Cen-
ter, 2006). The European Union experienced a particularly pronounced growth of procure-
ment volume since 1995. EUROSTAT data indicates that EU-15 procurement expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP more than doubled in the period 1995-2006, increasing from 1.41 per-
cent to 3.15 percent. Although this figure is already non-negligible, it can be expected that the 
magnitude of public demand expenditure is significantly higher in reality. EUROSTAT data 
reflects government procurement subject to the obligations established by EU directives, 
which is only a fraction of total public procurement markets (EU, 2004).
4 In general, esti-
mates of the importance of public procurement for OECD economies vary depending on the 
methodology used for their calculation and on the definition of procurement employed (Au-
det, 2002). Second, regarding the role of government demand, one line of argumentation rests 
on the importance of the inter-industrial composition of public purchases. Government de-
mand is likely to affect decision making within supplier firms, particularly with respect to 
investment in R&D since in a number of markets the public sector is the first user of innova-
tions, patents, and products (Dalpé et al., 1992). In general, public demand frequently consti-
tutes a large fraction of total demand in sectors of significant technological content, such as 
environmental protection, transportation, and medical equipment (Edquist & Hommen, 2000; 
Edler & Georghiou, 2007). In some industries, however, government purchases comprise a 
relatively small portion of overall demand (Marron, 2003). The above figures on the quantita-
tive relevance of public procurement become even more impressive when it is taken into ac-
count that government purchases are often concentrated in few specific markets. Third, an-
                                                 
2 Development pairs are one form of an innovation network, which is usually regarded to be conducive to user-
producer interaction and interactive learning (Lundvall, 1988; Powell & Grodal, 2004). 
3 The term “procurement” refers “to the function of purchasing goods or services from an outside body” (Ar-
rowsmith 2005, p. 1). If the state is the awarding authority for a procurement contract, “public procurement” 
takes place. “Public procurement” and “public demand” are treated as being synonymous throughout this paper. 
4 The European Commission emanates from an overall volume of public procurement in Europe of around 363 
billion euro or 16.2 percent of European GDP (EU, 2008).  
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other viewpoint comes into play that addresses the interrelation between the demand and sup-
ply side. In various cases, the government acted as a demanding customer that was both will-
ing and able to interact with supplier firms. It did not restrict its activity to the passive role of 
providing market incentives but actively showed inventors a beneficial path to pursue in their 
research efforts.  
  In essence, various studies that argue empirically suggest a significant impact of pub-
lic demand spending on private innovation activities. However, of the several factors that 
drive this result we focus on government procurement as being part of the economic condi-
tions affecting the profitability of innovations. Specifically, we develop an innovation-driven 
Schumpeterian growth model that allows us to investigate how the inter-industrial composi-
tion of public demand influences the pace of technological change as well as of economic 
growth.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review 
of the literature on public expenditure and (endogenous) growth. We highlight a number of 
shortcomings of existing models that motivated this paper. Section 3 introduces the basic 
model. Section 4 characterizes the balanced-growth equilibrium and the steady-state proper-
ties of the model. Section 5 examines the transitional dynamics and analyzes the dynamic 
response of the economy to a permanent change in the technological composition of govern-
ment purchases. Section 6 explores the welfare implications of the model, and Section 7 of-
fers some concluding comments. 
 
2.  A Brief Overview of Public Spending in the Literature on (Endogenous) Growth 
The role of public spending for aggregate economic activity is a subject with a long 
history in the growth literature. Within the neoclassical growth model, one traditional debate 
centered around the question whether fiscal policy can be an effective tool in mitigating the 
size of business cycle fluctuations (Turnovsky, 1977; Baxter & King, 1993). The macroeco-
nomic implications of war expenditure have also been analyzed extensively (Braun & 
McGrattan, 1993). These approaches were amended by models that study the link between 
government spending and economic growth, where public spending is incorporated as a sepa-
rate argument in the production function to reflect its impact on the productive capacity of the 
economy (Arrow & Kurz, 1970; Barro, 1990). While Arrow & Kurz (1970) modeled long-run 
growth as being solely driven by exogenous factors, Barro’s (1990) seminal contribution im-
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plied responsiveness of equilibrium growth to government purchasing behaviour.
5 Later ex-
tensions of these models of “productive public spending” explored the role of the composition 
of government spending, basically distinguishing between public consumption and public 
investment (Ahmed & Yoo, 1995; Chen, 2006) or considering specific functional categories 
of public expenditure such as infrastructure (Fisher & Turnovsky, 1998) or education (Mon-
teiro & Turnovsky, 2008). The emphasis on supply-side effects that is prevalent in this stream 
of literature, however, turns out to be an irritating characteristic when demand-side effects of 
public spending are in the center of attention. Moreover, models in the neoclassical tradition 
do not usually focus explicitly on the sources of technological change.  
New inspiring insights into the mechanisms of the growth process have been provided 
by innovation-driven growth theory, a stratum of literature originated by Romer (1990), 
Grossman & Helpman (1991a and 1991b), and Aghion & Howitt (1992). Within this frame-
work, technological change requires an intentional investment of resources by profit-seeking 
firms. It is further argued that “technology” is non-rival in nature so that innovation/invention 
costs must be incurred only once, and any newly discovered idea can be used for the produc-
tion of infinite units. Non-rivalry of knowledge translates any uniform increase in the size of 
the market into an unambiguously larger profit flow for each successful innovator (Young, 
1998). Demand conditions thus affect the incentive for firms to devote resources to R&D and 
(potentially) bear the risk of failure. It is all the more astonishing that policy exercises in this 
class of models, while encompassing the analysis of R&D subsidies (Segerstrom, 1998; Li, 
2003), of public incentives for human capital accumulation (Arnold, 1998 and 2002; Bucci, 
2003) as well as of industrial policy (Dinopoulos & Segerstrom, 1999; Giordani & Zampar-
elli, 2008) have so far largely neglected the view of public expenditure as a demand tool.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two studies that attempted to fill this gap: 
Censolo & Colombo (2008) and Cozzi & Impullitti (2008). The former extends the original 
Grossman & Helpman (1991b, chap. 3) model of expanding product variety. Censolo and 
Colombo add the government as a third sector that demands a homogeneous consumption 
good and a differentiated commodity in order to produce utility-enhancing public services. 
They thoroughly investigate the long-run effects of changes in government demand composi-
tion on rates of innovative change and of economic growth. The transitional adjustment path 
is also analyzed. Their model, however, is insufficient to capture some of the essential fea-
tures of innovation-based growth, leading to three points of criticism. First, innovations do not 
solely extend the scope of available products (horizontal innovation) but also improve the 
                                                 
5 The title of the present paper, a variation of Barro’s (1990) “Government Spending in a Simple Model of En-
dogenous Growth”, is meant to acknowledge the pioneering role of Barro’s work. 
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quality of existing ones (vertical innovation). Scherer (1980) cites survey evidence for the 
importance of vertical compared to horizontal innovations. According to him, firms devote 59 
percent of their research outlays to product improvement, 28 percent to developing new prod-
ucts and 13 percent to enhance process technology. Hence quality-improved products replace 
inferior ones that perform similar functions. This immediately leads to the second point. A 
model of vertical innovation has the property that new technologies make the previous ones 
obsolete. By quality improvements, firms using inferior technologies will be squeezed out of 
the market. By contrast, in Censolo & Colombo (2008) every producer of an intermediate 
good competes on equal footing with all existing products as society uses old goods along 
with new ones. An obsolescence of products that might occur when an innovation takes hold, 
i.e., the Schumpeterian “creative destruction” effect, is not incorporated in their model. The 
third and last point deals with the uncertainty of research efforts. Censolo & Colombo (2008) 
treat R&D like other production activities – primary inputs are automatically converted into 
output. However, a number of scholars have stressed the inherent uncertainties associated 
with R&D. The stochastic nature of the innovation process is incorporated in most of the pre-
sent models of vertical innovation.
6 
The above-mentioned points of criticism are resolved in Cozzi & Impullitti (2008). 
The authors develop a Schumpeterian growth model in which growth originates from firms 
engaging in R&D in order to improve the quality of existing products in a continuum of mo-
nopolistic competitive industries. The innovation process is stochastic in nature. Heterogene-
ity is introduced into the size of the quality improvements that occur when an innovation is 
found in an industry. Cozzi and Impullitti then elucidate how the distribution of public de-
mand expenditure over the variety of heterogeneous industries affects the rate of technologi-
cal change and the endogenous supply of skills. Although the authors elegantly set out the 
main features of Schumpeterian growth in a heterogeneous industry setting, their model suf-
fers from a severe limitation. Neither is it possible to explicitly solve the model for the long-
run equilibrium, nor can the transitional dynamics be illustrated analytically. Moreover, Cozzi 
and Impullitti omit a discussion of welfare implications of the inter-industrial composition of 
public demand. 
  Our paper is primarily inspired by Cozzi & Impullitti (2008). We maintain the basic 
ingredient of Cozzi and Impullitti’s model, namely that the economy is populated by a con-
tinuum of heterogeneous industries. This allows us to account for the observable fact that 
government demand is not uniformly distributed across industries. In one crucial aspect we 
                                                 
6 See Dinopoulos & Şener (2007) for a recent overview. 
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deviate from Cozzi and Impulliti, namely by imposing a specific assumption on how indus-
tries differ in terms of their innovation capacity. In this we draw upon the recent contribution 
by Minniti et al. (2008) who model the size of innovation as being Pareto distributed. This 
extension allows a more rigorous analytical treatment of the model compared to Cozzi and 
Impullitti. We can explicitly solve for the balanced-growth path (hereafter BGP) of the econ-
omy and for the transitional dynamics that lead to the BGP. In addition, we are able to make a 
normative statement on the optimality of the BGP in the decentralized economy and show 
how the government can ensure social optimum by adjusting the allocation of its demand ex-
penditure across industries.  
  
3. The  Model 
3.1  Description of the Model Economy 
The economy in the model is closed and consists of two sectors – a final goods (or 
manufacturing) sector and a research sector where firms seek for innovations. To avoid un-
necessary complications and highlight the basic forces at work, labor is the only input factor 
used in both sectors and is not further differentiated. Labor supply decisions are treated as 
being exogenous. 
As is standard in the Schumpeterian growth literature, there is a continuum of indus-
tries in the unit interval indexed by  [0,1] ω∈  in the economy under consideration. Each indus-
try produces exactly one consumption good (or product line). The outputs of the various in-
dustries substitute only imperfectly for each other. As expansion of variety is not the focus of 
our model, the set of commodities is fixed in the progress of time. Vertical innovations im-
prove the quality of the respective consumption good. Let the discrete variable  {0,1,2,...} j∈  
denote the quality level. Each innovation in industry ω  leads to a jump in quality of the prod-
uct in question from  j  to  1 j + . The quality increments, denoted by λ , happen independently 
of each other – an improvement in one industry does not induce an improvement in any other 
industry. This idea can be illustrated by the metaphor of a quality ladder.  
Following the specification introduced by Grossman & Helpman (1991a and 1991b), 
in a given point in time a good ω  possesses a quality level of 
j λ  if  j  quality jumps of size 
λ  have happened so far. At time  0 t = , the state-of-the-art quality product in each industry is 
0 j = ; that is, one firm in each industry knows how to produce a  0 j =  quality product, and 
no firm knows how to produce any higher quality product. Further, in  0 t =  the quality of 
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each good equals unity, i.e., 
0 1 λ = . Over time, state-of-the art quality follows a progression 
up a quality ladder. Each step up the ladder, however, requires intentional R&D efforts by 
firms.  
In previous Schumpeterian growth models (Grossman & Helpman, 1991a and 1991b; 
Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Segerstrom, 1998; Li, 2001 and 2003), different industries were usu-
ally treated as being structurally identical so that the economy could be regarded as if it con-
sisted of only a single industry. Therefore, these approaches are only suitable when growth is 
analyzed on the macro level but cannot account for industry-specific effects of demand pull 
and technology push in the multitude of existing industries. The industrial organization litera-
ture presents overwhelming empirical evidence that the innovative behavior of firms varies 
across industries (Stadler, 1999). Geroski (1998) finds a considerable amount of heterogeneity 
on the firm level that does not disappear over time.  
In order to overcome the symmetric treatment of industries, we assume the size of the 
quality jump after a successful innovation as being uncertain. In line with the recent work by 
Minniti et al. (2008), the realization of each R&D race is drawn independently from a Pareto 
distribution. Modeling uncertainty associated with the size of the quality jump to obey a 
Pareto distribution is supported by the patent literature. Scherer (1965) analyzes patent activi-
ties of the 500 largest firms in the U.S. and finds that the distribution of U.S. patent values 
(measured by profit returns) is highly skewed toward the low-value side, and heavy tailed to 
the high-value side. This evidence fits to the generic properties of a Pareto distribution quite 
well. Successive empirical work on patent values and citations often found the Pareto distri-
bution as being accurate in describing the data. Harhoff et al. (2005), for instance, ask patent 
holders in Germany and in the U.S. to estimate the value of their inventions. The distribution 
of values yielded by this survey is strikingly close to the Pareto distribution for a wide range 
of patent values.
7 
  The rationale to utilize the Pareto distribution for capturing heterogeneity on the indus-
try level in a Schumpeterian growth model lies in the fact that this stream of models rests on 
the assumption that for each successful innovation a patent is granted. Moreover, the size of 
the quality jump associated with a successfully innovating firm affects its profitability for the 
innovator. For these reasons, empirical results indicating that patent values often follow a 
Pareto distribution are well suited to be applied to our model economy.  
                                                 
7 Within a slightly different methodological framework, Kortum (1997) and Jones (2005) model the realization 
of new ideas (interpreted as productivity levels and production techniques, respectively) as being Pareto distrib-
uted. 
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Even more support for Pareto distributed innovation size can be derived from the em-
pirical literature on markups of product prices over marginal cost. Schumpeterian growth 
models share the feature that quality jumps are understood as an indicator of monopoly power 
in an industry. More precisely, the quality jump is usually modeled as being equal to the 
markup of goods prices over marginal cost that a quality leader can charge. Oliveira Martins 
et al. (1996) estimate markups for 2-digit U.S. manufacturing industries for the period 1970-





































Source:    Own illustration, using data by Oliveira Martins et al. (1996, p. 30) 
Figure 1:  Stylized probability density function of U.S. markup ratios 
 
It is apparent that the distribution of markups is right-skewed; the mass of the distribu-
tion is below the average economy-wide markup (equal to 1.17 ). In fact, only one third of the 
industries turn out to have a markup above the mean. 
 
3.2 Consumers 
Each household is modeled as a dynastic family whose size grows over time at an ex-
ogenous rate n which also equals the rate of population growth. Each household member ine-
lastically supplies labor services in exchange for wages. We normalize the total number of 
individuals at time  0 t =  to unity, by appropriate choice of unit. Thus, the population of work-
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ers at time t equals  ( )
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Equation (2) describes Cobb-Douglas consumer preferences, where  ( , , ) dj t ω  is the consump-
tion of quality  j  in product line ω  at time t. The utility derived by an individual from con-
sumption is therefore determined by the quality-weighted amount of consumption, integrated 
(because we have a continuum of industries) over all industries  [0,1] ω∈ . This formulation of 
instantaneous utility implies that a consumer enjoys one unit of good ω  that was improved  j  
times as much as she would enjoy  ( , )
j t λω  units of the good if it had never been improved, 
with ( , ) 1 t λ ω > . 








= ∑ . It follows 
that, hypothetically, all existing quality levels (
max 0,1,2..., j j = ) of each product line could be 
consumed at a given point in time. However, we show later that in each product line only the 
good with the lowest quality-adjusted price will face demand.  
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility (1) subject to the following 
intertemporal budget constraint: 
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where  () 0 B  is the ex ante endowment of asset holdings of the representative household,  ( ) wt  
is the wage rate earned by each individual,  ( ) Tt is a per capita lump-sum tax and ( ) ct is the 
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8 Our infinite-horizon representative agent framework can be justified by referring to Barro (1974). However, 
Kirman (1992) points out some critical aggregation issues involved here. 
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where ( , , ) p jt ω  is the price of product ω  with quality  j  at time t. 
The household maximization problem is solved in three stages: first, the allocation of 
expenditure at any given point in time for each product across available quality levels; sec-
ond, the allocation of expenditure on the different product lines ω ; and, third, the time path of 
expenditure such that intertemporal utility reaches a maximum.  
  It can be easily shown that an individual is indifferent between quality vintage  j  and 
1 j −  if  () ( )( ) ,1 , pj pj ω ωλ ω −= . If the quality leader in industry ω  charges a price mar-
ginally below  () λ ω , the next best quality faces no demand. The elasticity of substitution be-
tween goods of different quality vintages within the same industry is infinite. To break ties, 
we make the assumption that if a household member is indifferent between two quality vin-
tages, she will buy the higher quality product.  
  From the formulation of the consumption index in (2) it follows that goods of different 
vintages in each industry are perceived as perfect substitutes, once the quality adjustment is 
made. As already noted, products of different industries enter utility symmetrically, and the 
elasticity of substitution between every pair of industries equals minus one. This yields the 
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 (4) 
  The dynamic optimization problem, i.e., the allocation of lifetime expenditure over 
time, consists of maximizing discounted utility (1) subject to (2), (3), and (4). The solution of 











This intertemporal optimization condition implies that a constant consumption expenditure 
path is optimal when the market interest rate is equal to ρ. A rate above ρ  induces consumers 
to increase savings “today” and spend more “tomorrow,” resulting in a rise of consumption 
over time.  
Since preferences are homothetic, aggregate demand at time t in industry ω , denoted 
by ( , , ) Dj t ω , is given by  (, ,) (, ,)() Dj t dj tL t ω ω = . 
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3.3 Product  Markets 
The constant returns to scale production function  Y YL =  holds for any quality level in 
industry ω . The firms within each industry compete over prices. Only a single firm possesses 
the technology to produce the highest quality product, while its product has a quality advan-
tage of λ  over the next best quality in the industry. The optimal strategy for the quality leader 
is to set the limit price (, ) L p t ω , preventing any other firm in the industry from offering its 
product without losses (Grossman & Helpman, 1991a and 1991b; Segerstrom, 1998).
9 The 
quality leader will set a quality-adjusted price below the unit costs of its nearest competitor, 
while that competitor will come up with a price equal to its own marginal cost. Hence the 
highest price the quality leader can set to capture the entire industry market is its lead over the 
next best quality follower, implying  ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) L p tt w t ω λω λω = = .
10 There is no incentive for 
the quality leader to set a price above the limit price because if she did, she would lose all of 
its customers.  
  We now introduce government demand (i.e., government procurement spending) into 
the model. Per capita public demand spending in industry ω  at time t is denoted by 
(, ) 0 Gt ω ≥ , for all  [0,1] ω∈  and  0 t ≥ . Because we wish to isolate wealth effects from the 
distortionary effects of taxation, we assume that the government uses lump-sum tax revenues 
to finance its procurement expenditure. We further assume that the government balances its 
budget at any time. To avoid unnecessary complications, we abstract from modeling any ef-
fects of public demand expenditure on individual utility or on marginal productivity of private 
input factors in manufacturing or research.  
  Since static consumer demand (4) is unit elastic and the quality leader charges a price 
of ( , ) t λ ω  both for private consumers and the government, the quantity of a state-of-the-art 
quality product in each industry ω  sold to private consumers equals  () ()() , Ltct t λ ω , while 
public demand for products at the quality frontier in each industry ω  is equal to 
() () () , , LtG t t ω λω . Given that marginal production cost are unity (recall that labor is the 
numeraire), the quality leader in each industry ω  earns a profit flow of: 
                                                 
9 Note that Li (2001, 2003) as well as Minniti et al. (2008) develop quality-ladder models in which the producer 
of the state-of-the-art quality can charge the unconstrained monopoly price. Whether or not she can do that and 
still leaves no positive profit to producers of previous vintages depends on the size of the quality jump and the 
degree of substitutability of different vintages. Aghion & Howitt (1998, chap. 2) label as “drastic innovation” the 
case when the monopoly price can be set and the producers of the next best qualities are still squeezed out of the 
market as well as the case when the limit price is set as “non-drastic innovation”. 
10 Limit pricing obviously leads to tension between static and dynamic optimality (static optimality requires 
marginal cost pricing). But without positive profits innovation would cease, and so would growth. 
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⎧⎫ ⎪⎪ =− + − ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎨⎬ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
. (6) 
In equation (6),  () ,1 t λω − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  is to be interpreted as the markup factor over marginal cost. 
Thus, the parameter  ( , ) t λ ω  describes the degree of monopoly power. 
 
3.4 R&D  Races 
Free entry into each R&D race prevails so that  firms may target their research effort at 
any industry. Labor is the only input used in R&D and can be freely allocated between manu-
facturing and research. The frictionless nature of the labor market implies that workers earn 
the same wage in R&D as in manufacturing,  1 w = . Firms conduct R&D activities in indus-
tries in which they are not the current quality leader. This excludes the case in which a firm 
producing the current state-of-the-art quality in industry ω  accumulates patents in that indus-
try.
11 The aim of each firm’s R&D efforts is a superior quality and to monopolize the market 
by achieving a patent (with infinite patent length). All firms have access to the same R&D 
technology. In industry ω  at time t, a firm engaged in R&D that employs  ( , ) i lt ω  units of 













= , (7) 
where  0 A >  is a given technology parameter, and  ( , ) 0 Xt ω >  is a function that captures the 
difficulty of conducting R&D, taken as given by each R&D firm. The “innovation production 
function” as specified in (7) takes into account the stochastic in the R&D process. For firm i 
in industry ω , lagging behind the state-of-the-art quality at time t, ( , ) i I td t ω  indicates the 
probability to win the R&D race and become the next quality leader within the time interval 
[, ] tt d t + . In (7), the time interval dt  approaches zero. Hence  ( , ) i I t ω  is to be interpreted as 
the instantaneous probability of firm i being successful in finding the next higher quality 
product per unit of time. 
                                                 
11 The effect that monopolists may systematically have less incentive to innovate than potential rivals, eventually 
ceding technological leadership, was first described by Arrow (1962) and is a common feature in the literature of 
Industrial Organization (Fudenberg et al., 1983; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1985) as well as of R&D-driven endoge-
nous growth models. The occurrence of this effect can be explained as follows. A two-step quality advantage of 
the monopolist comes along with smaller profits than the gain of a one-step quality improvement in another 
industry. Therefore, the monopolist will direct all R&D resources to other industries to become the market leader 
there. As it is the dominant strategy for quality leaders not to invest in further improving their technology, the 
monopoly will only remain as long as no better technology is found in the R&D sector.  
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  We can conveniently aggregate across firms to obtain the industry-wide arrival rate of 
innovation by assuming that the probability of winning an R&D race is independent across 
firms, across industries, and over time. It follows that (7) holds for each firm at any time irre-
spective of the workforce employed intra- or inter-industrially. The industry-wide arrival rate 
of innovation reads: 











=  (8) 
where  , (, ) (, ) II i i Lt l t ω ω =∑  denotes the industry-wide R&D labor employment, and 
(, ) (, ) i i I tI t ω ω =∑  is the cumulated arrival rate of innovation of all firms in industry ω  at 
time t.  
The empirically uncomfortable “scale effect” property
12 of early R&D-driven endoge-
nous growth models (Romer, 1990; Grossman & Helpman, 1991a and 1991b; Aghion & 
Howitt, 1992) is removed by assuming that R&D difficulty grows in each industry at a rate 














where 0 μ >  is exogenously given and  ( ) 0 ,0 X X ω =  for all ω . An ever increasing R&D 
difficulty, as formalized in equation (9), reflects the idea of rational behavior of R&D firms 
(Li, 2003). During each R&D race, firms may choose between an infinite array of research 
projects with varying degree of R&D difficulty,  ( , ) X t ω . While the most promising research 
projects are tried first, these may fail, making firms switch to less promising projects with a 
higher degree of R&D difficulty. With this in mind, innovating becomes more difficult over 
time. and technological opportunities vanish because of a series of research failures.  
This idea of “fishing out” of innovations, which causes a fall in relative productivity of 
R&D inputs, is consistent with empirical observations. Because Schumpeterian growth mod-
els are characterized by the assumption that a steady part of innovations (in fact 100 percent) 
is patented, patent statistics can be a natural judge of these models. In the second half of the 
20th century, patents granted in the U.S. to residents showed a certain degree of stability, 
fluctuating around 40,000-50,000 per year, while the number of researchers increased greatly. 
This implies a sharp decrease in patent-to-researcher ratio (Kortum, 1997). Segerstrom (2000, 
                                                 
12 “Scale effect” here means a positive relationship between the long-run growth rate of the economy and the 
population size. Its underlying intuition has been nicely described by Jones (2004, p. 14): “A larger population 
means more Mozarts and Newtons, and more Wright brothers, Sam Waltons, and William Shockleys.” Empirical 
studies, however, typically reject such population size level effects (see especially Jones, 1995a). 
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Table 1) finds a comparable development of the patent-to-researcher ratio for a number of 
highly developed countries such as the U.S., France, Japan, Sweden, and Great Britain.
13 
Once a firm becomes successful in finding an innovation, the size of that innovation is 
drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter 1/κ  and a scale parameter equal to 
one.









=  [1, ) λ∈ ∞ , (10) 
where  (0,1) κ ∈  is a parameter that measures the degree of dispersion or heterogeneity of the 
Pareto distribution. The higher κ , the fatter the upper tail of the distribution of quality incre-
ments. The median of the Pareto distribution equals 2
κ  and the mean is given by 1/(1 ) κ − . 
Both median and mean increase in κ , while the mean is always larger than the median.  
  For analytical tractability, and to make the analysis of transitional dynamics less tedi-
ous, we assume that the initial distribution of λ  values is given by  () g λ  at  0 t = . Then, as the 
R&D dynamics start off and successfully innovating firms draw new values of λ , the distri-
bution of λ  values does not change over time. Notice further that  0 (, ) X tX ω =  for all ω  
means  0 (, 0 ) I I ω =  (constant) for all ω . Hence a symmetric equilibrium path must exist along 
which ( , ) ( ) I tI t ω =  and  ( , ) ( ) X tX t ω =  for all ω . As Grossman & Helpman (1991a and 
1991b), Segerstrom (1998), Li (2003) and Minniti et al. (2008), we focus on this symmetric 
equilibrium.  
  We are now in the position to derive the optimal amount of labor  ( , ) i lt ω  that each 
firm i employs in R&D. Let  ( , )
e t υ ω  be the expected discounted reward for R&D successes in 
industry ω  at time t. By hiring  ( , ) i lt ω  units of labor in R&D for a time interval dt , firm i 
expects to realize  ( , )
e t υ ω  with probability  ( , ) i I t ω . The optimization problem to be solved 
by firm i at each point in time can then be written as: 
 
(, )








υ ωω − . 








υω = . (11) 
                                                 
13 Benjamin F. Jones (2005) sheds some light on the consequences of an ever rising R&D difficulty for the or-
ganization of innovation activity. The author analyzes U.S. patent data and presents evidence on inventors striv-
ing for narrower, more specialized expertise and showing a greater reliance on teamwork. 
14 We here adopt the specification used in Minniti et al. (2008). 
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The RHS of (11) is equivalent to the marginal effective cost of innovating. Equation (11) im-
plies that the expected reward for a successful innovation,  ( , )
e t υ ω , has to increase when 
R&D difficulty grows in order to provide sufficient incentives for firms to participate in an 
R&D race. Only if (11) holds for all ω , can a symmetric equilibrium exist, where the innova-
tion rate  () I t  is positive, finite, and the same across all industries. In the next section, we de-
termine the expected value of the uncertain profit stream of finding a product of superior qual-
ity, ( , )
e t υ ω . 
 
3.5  Stock Market and Specification of Public Demand 
Firms that participate in an R&D race issue securities on a perfect financial market.
15 
R&D-performing firms are thus financed by consumers’ savings channeled to them through 
the stock market. Thus, consumers are allowed to choose the R&D sectors where to employ 
their savings by buying securities. The claims pay nothing in the event that research efforts 
fail, but entitle the claimants to the income stream associated with quality (and industry) lead-
ership if the efforts succeed.
16 In addition to the (risky) investment in R&D-performing firms, 
consumers can also buy a risk-free bond with the rate of return  () rt. The interest rate  () rt 
adjusts to clear the capital market at each moment in time. The absence of profitable arbitrage 
opportunities makes the expected rate of return on securities issued by R&D firms equal to 
the risk-free rate of return  () rt. The no arbitrage condition for the stock market is then given 
by (Blanchard & Fischer, 1989, p. 215): 
 
(, ) (, )
(1 ( ) ) ( ) ( )











where ( , )
e t π ω  denotes the expected profits earned by a successful innovator.  
The first term on the LHS of (12) describes the accrued dividend paid to the consum-
ers during time interval dt . The second term shows possible capital gains of a firm’s share. 
However, the value of the quality leader will only appreciate if the respective quality leader is 
able to maintain her position – this happens with a probability 1( ) I td t − . The third term 
represents the capital loss shareholders will suffer in case a better quality is found during the 
time interval dt . Because a producer of the latest quality vintage who loses her leadership due 
                                                 
15 In other words, all moral hazard and adverse selection problems which – as empirical observations imply – 
exist mainly for young firms when they attempt to raise capital funds for risky R&D investments, are completely 
neglected. The integration of imperfect capital markets is a primary aim of newer models of endogenous growth 
(e.g., King & Levine, 1993; Aghion & Howitt, 2005). 
16 As there is no physical capital in the economy, shares of R&D-performing firms are the only existing com-
mercial paper. 
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to a new innovation is immediately squeezed out of the market – causing her stock value to 
shrink to zero instantly – shareholders lose everything in this case. The third term is thus 
equal to the probability of the arrival of an innovation per unit of time,  ( ) I td t . The RHS of 
(12) describes the alternative investment in a safe bond. 
Dividing (12) by dt  and calculating the limit  0 dt →  yields: 
 
(, ) (, )
() ()











In the stock market equilibrium, the expected dividend rate plus the expected rate of capital 
gains is equal to the rate of return of the risk-free security plus a risk premium. An expression 
f o r  (, ) / (, )
ee tt υ ωυ ω   can be obtained by using (11), and the dividend rate becomes: 
 
(, ) ( )
() ()











Before we can derive an expression for the expected profits of a firm winning an R&D race, 
(, )
e t π ω , we have to be more concrete on how the government allocates its demand expendi-
ture among the various industries in our model economy.  
Once a firm wins an R&D race in industry ω , the government observes the realized 
quality jump and then decides how much to purchase from the new quality leader. Specifi-
cally, we model public demand spending as a linear combination of two rules. On the one 
extreme, there is a perfectly symmetric rule in which each industry in the economy faces the 
same government demand. On the other extreme, there is a rule that allocates public spending 
in proportion to the quality jump that occurs in a particular industry; the higher the quality 
jump in industry ω , the more the successful innovator in this industry benefits from public 
demand. Formalizing this idea yields the following public demand rule: 
  





















⎧−< ⎪ ⎪ − ≡ ⎨
⎪ ≥
⎪ ⎩−
 as well as  1 0 G ε < <  and  2 0 G ε <<. 
The demand policy rule (14) necessitates some further remarks. In (14), G  denotes the aver-
age per capita public procurement, i.e., the value of public demand spending a quality leader 
in each industry ω  would receive if the government spread its expenditure  ( ) G ω  evenly 
across all industries. However, treating all industries equally is not the only option for the 
government to spend its financial resources in our model. Any increase in the fiscal policy 
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parameter γ  will lead to a public demand policy that more heavily promotes industries with 
above-average quality jumps.
17 This second part of (14) can be nicely interpreted if, just for 
illustrative purposes, we assume  1 γ = . This would mean that if the quality increment coming 
along with an innovation in industry ω  is smaller than the average economy-wide quality 
increment, public purchases in this industry are lower than they would have been if the gov-
ernment had distributed its expenditure symmetrically over all industries. On the other hand, 
if an innovator in industry ω  drew a value of λ  above the average quality jump, she would 
benefit more from public spending than under the perfectly symmetric demand policy rule.  
It is worth stressing that (14) imposes a “bang-bang solution” on public demand ex-
penditure.
18 For each 0 γ > , once an industry experiences a quality jump above (below) econ-
omy-wide average, the government abruptly spends more (less) in this industry, irrespective 
of how far beyond the average this industry finds itself after the quality jump. It is easy to 
show that the strictly positive values  1 ε  and  2 ε , which indicate how much government spend-
ing in “low-jump” respectively “high-jump” industries deviates from average spending, can-
not be chosen independently.
19  
As stated above, the distribution of λ  values does not change over time. Thus, al-
though there is uncertainty at the industry level concerning the size of the quality jump that 
occurs after an innovation arrives, there is always the same share of industries with quality 
increments above respectively below average at the macro level. Moreover, we make the sim-
plifying assumption that average per capita public demand expenditure,G , is fixed in the pro-
gress of time.  
  After solving for the expected profits of a firm winning an R&D race by taking into 
account (14)
20 we obtain an expression for  ( , )



















 , (15) 
where  () { }
1
2 11 1 1
κ εκ ⎡⎤ Γ≡ − − − ⎣⎦  is a strictly positive value. In (15), an innovator’s profits 
are discounted using the risk-free rate of return  ( ) rt and the instantaneous probability that the 
                                                 
17 This becomes even more obvious when one observes that (14) can be rewritten as  () , GtG ω γε =+. 
18 Bang-bang solution is a term used in optimal control theory. If the optimal control switches from one extreme 
to the other at certain times (i.e., is never strictly in between the bounds) then that control is referred to as a 
bang-bang solution. 
19 See App. A for a formal derivation of the parameter restriction. 
20 The mathematical details are relegated to App. B. 
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firm loses its leadership position,  ( ) I t , adjusted by the increase in R&D difficulty over time, 
() () X tX t  . Here the effect of “creative destruction” is revealed: the more research (is ex-
pected to) occur in an industry, the shorter, ceteris paribus, the expected duration of the mo-
nopoly profits and the smaller the incentive to innovate. 
We now define a new endogenous variable that serves as a measure of relative (i.e., 



















 . (16) 
By subtracting the rate of population growth, n, in the denominator of (16), we also take into 
account that aggregate consumer markets, and thus profits earned by a successful innovator, 
increase over time. Notice that (16) also holds outside the balanced-growth equilibrium de-
rived below. 
  Combing equations (11) and (16) and recalling that  () () () x tX t L t ≡  gives us the fol-
lowing R&D equilibrium condition: 
 













 . (17) 
Profit maximization of R&D firms imposes that in the research equilibrium the marginal 
revenue product of an innovation [RHS of (17)] must equal its marginal cost [LHS of (17)] at 
each point in time.  
 
3.6 Labor  Market 
Labor demand in manufacturing equals aggregate demand from both private and pub-
lic consumers (recall that the production function in manufacturing reads  Y YL =  and that we 
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⎩⎭ ∫∫ ∫ . 
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Using the Pareto density function given in (10) as well as the public demand rule as specified 
in (14) and (A.3), total employment necessary to satisfy private and public consumers’ de-














An equation for R&D labor can be derived from solving (8) for the R&D input of a firm in 
industry  ω , then aggregating over the continuum of industries  [0,1] ω∈ , while taking into 
account that we assume symmetric behavior, where the industry-level innovation rate  ( , ) I t ω  








Labor-market clearing implies that  ( ) ( ) ( ) YI Lt L t L t = +  is always fulfilled, which, when 













The labor market equilibrium in (18) holds for all t outside the BGP by assumption that factor 
markets clear instantaneously. Equation (18) completes the description of the model.  
 
4. Balanced-Growth  Equilibrium 
We now solve for the BGP of the model, where all endogenous variables grow at a 
constant (although not necessarily at the same) rate and research intensity  () I t  is common 
across industries. According to (8), constant growth rate of R&D difficulty X constrains I to 
be constant over time. For that reason,  0 xx cc = =   is implied by (18). Then,  ( ) rt ρ =  pre-
vails by (5), meaning that the market interest rate must be equal to the rate of time preference 
in the BGP. Equations (9), (17), and (18) represent a system of three equations in three un-
knowns  x,  c, and I . Solving this system of equations allows us to uniquely determine bal-
anced-growth equilibrium values for all endogenous variables. 
  We first derive an expression for the equilibrium research intensity. Taking the loga-





= . (19) 
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According to equation (19), the balanced-growth value of the research intensity is completely 
pinned down by the population growth rate, n, and the parameter governing the R&D diffi-
culty, μ .  
Having determined the equilibrium value of I, we are now in the position to solve for 
the balanced-growth values of x and c. Given that 
* I n μ =  and r ρ =  in the balanced-
growth equilibrium, R&D equilibrium condition (17) can be written as: 
 

















Equation (20) defines a negative linear relationship between per capita private consumption 














defining a positive linear relationship between per capita private consumption expenditure, c, 
and relative R&D difficulty, x. Equation (20) is an upward sloping line in (,) cx space, while 
(21) is a downward sloping linear function in (,) cx space. Necessary and sufficient condition 
for both lines to have a unique and positive intersection is given by  1 G < . Solving the system 
of linear equations in (20) and (21) by applying Cramer’s rule uniquely determines the bal-
anced-growth equilibrium values of x and c as: 
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⎡ ⎤ ++Γ − − +− ++ −+ Γ ⎣ ⎦ =
+− +
. (23) 
Along a BGP, the fraction of the labor force devoted to R&D can be determined as follows. 
From (8), the R&D labor share reads  /( ) nx A η . Substituting into this expression using (22) 
yields: 








+Γ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ +− + ⎝⎠
. (24) 
We are now in the position to analyze the long-run effects of a change in the parameters gov-
erning public demand expenditure. By differentiating (22) with respect to the appropriate pa-
rameter, it is readily established that relative R&D difficulty in balanced-growth equilibrium, 
* x , is an increasing function of γ  unaffected by changes of G . In the same vein, the equilib-
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rium value of average per capita private consumption expenditure, 
* c , increases in γ  but falls 
in G . The latter simply reflects the fact that as the government increases its (average) demand 
spending, it takes away resources from the private sector, thereby reducing private consump-
tion one-for-one.
21 The balanced-growth equilibrium share of R&D employment in (24) is an 
increasing function of γ  and does not depend on G . Notice further that the balanced-growth 
values of x, c, and  / I LL  are all positively affected by an increase in κ . The larger the ex-
pected size of innovations, the higher the values of the endogenous variables along the BGP. 
  Finally, we calculate the balanced-growth rate of the economy. Because we refrain 
from capital accumulation the concept of growth in the model relates to growth in each indi-
vidual’s utility. This property is shared by all Schumpeterian growth models in which firms’ 
R&D efforts are directed toward increasing the product quality, and per capita consumption 
does not change in equilibrium. However, even if the same amount of goods is consumed per 
person, individual utility in (2) augments if R&D turns out to be successful. To obtain an ex-
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⎣⎦ ∫∫ , (25) 
where  ()
1 max
0 , j td ω ω ∫  is a measure for the number of quality improvements aggregated over 
all industries  [0,1] ω∈ . The index 
max j  increases when firms are successful in innovating and 
firms engage in innovative R&D in all industries throughout time in any steady-state equilib-
rium. In each industry ω , the (Poisson distributed) probability of exactly m improvements 
within a time interval of length τ  can be calculated as: 
  () (,) / !
m I f mI e m
τ ττ
− = , 
where  (,) fm τ  represents the measure of products that are improved exactly m times in an 
interval of length τ . Following Davidson & Segerstrom (1998, p. 562),  ()
1 max
0 , j td ω ω ∫  then 
equals  tI . Taking this and (19) into account, differentiating (25) with respect to time yields 
the following balanced-growth rate of per capita utility:
22  
                                                 
21 This result of complete crowding-out is a consequence of our assumption that goods purchased by the gov-
ernment neither affect households’ utility nor firms’ production processes. 
22 Notice that the first integral on the RHS of (25) is constant along the BGP. We further exploit the fact that 
quality jumps follow a Pareto distribution, so  ()
1
0log ,td λ ωω κ = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∫  [using (10)]. 












We summarize the balanced-growth properties of our model economy by establishing the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. Existence and uniqueness of BGP 
If  1 G < , a unique balanced-growth equilibrium always exists, where per capita private con-
sumer expenditure, c, relative R&D difficulty, x, innovation rate in each industry, I, share of 
R&D workers in employment,  / I L L, and the rate of per capita utility growth, g, are all con-
stant and given by (19), (22), (23), (24), and (26), respectively. 
 
According to (26), the long-run rate of utility growth is proportional to the population 
growth rate. It is particularly noteworthy that (demand) policy changes have only temporary 
effects on growth. Such being the case, our model belongs to the class of so-called semi-
endogenous growth models.
23 Before discussing further the result of policy ineffectiveness in 
altering long-term economic growth it is worth stressing three implications of (26).  
  First, utility growth in (26) proceeds smoothly even though every good is improved 
after an irregular interval of time has elapsed. The economy-wide growth rate does not change 
in equilibrium because a large number of goods exists so that the proportion of goods im-
proved in a given time interval remains constant in steady state. Naturally, the smooth pace of 
progress on the macro level just masks the potential turmoil on the meso level. 
Second, utility growth increases in n. An obvious criticism against this result is that, in 
fact, countries with a quickly growing population do not usually exhibit the highest economic 
growth rates. One possible reply to this criticism is that the parameter n need not be tied to a 
specific country. Rather, the parameter could be interpreted as a measure of world population 
growth since the quality leader in each industry is not restricted to operating on domestic mar-
kets (Segerstrom 1998, p. 1299). However, as we have not incorporated foreign trade in our 
model, we do not want to give undue emphasis to this aspect. 
Third, the steady-state growth rate in (26) is an increasing function of κ , the parame-
ter determining the expected size of innovations. This is a new result in the literature on inno-
vation-driven growth models. According to equation (26), an increase in the average size of 
innovations stimulates growth. This is due to the fact that the equilibrium R&D intensity 
* I  
                                                 
23 This stratum of literature originated from the seminal paper by Jones (1995b). See Jones (1999) for an illumi-
nating essay on the differences between semi-endogenous and fully-endogenous growth models. 
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does not depend on κ , making the probability of arrival of innovations independent of their 
expected size.  
The model retains the standard neoclassical prediction that the balanced-growth rate of 
the economy is beyond the influence of policy. All of the values on the RHS of (26) are usu-
ally regarded as being outside of the range of government actions. This property of the model 
is due to our specification of R&D technology. This specification incorporates the idea of 
diminishing returns to knowledge to eliminate the scale effect of long-run economic growth. 
In consequence, sustained growth in R&D input is necessary just to maintain a given rate of 
technological change. However, the stark prediction that follows from that, namely that long-
run economic growth is independent of what fraction of society’s resources is assigned to 
R&D, should not be seen as a weakness of the model. Empirical support for the conjecture 
that long-run growth rates depend on macroeconomic policy is fragile at best. Stockey & Re-
belo (1995) find that the U.S. GDP growth rate did not respond significantly after the share of 
income tax on GDP grew from two to 15 percent in the early 1940s. Jones (1995a, p. 521) 
formulates concisely: “[…] nothing in the US experience during the last century appears to 
have had a permanent effect on growth.” Jones (1997) pointedly illustrates the accuracy of 
this statement with the following example: if one tried to predict U.S. per capita GDP in 1994 
by extrapolating a constant-growth path using data from 1870 to 1929, the predicted value 
would only understate per capita GDP by 10.6 percent. The empirical fragility of a relation-
ship between long-run growth and economic policies is precisely what is to be expected when 
referring to the model’s results.  
Policy ineffectiveness appears to be an inconvenient model feature prima facie. But a 
number of authors highlight the importance of studying transitional dynamics vis-à-vis bal-
anced-growth dynamics (e.g., Temple, 2003). Simulation exercises of innovation-based 
growth models typically suggest slow convergence to the long-run equilibrium. On the basis 
of his model of expanding product variety, Jones (1995b) finds that it takes approximately 62 
years to close half of the gap between the initial per capita income and its balanced-growth 
value. Steger (2003) calibrates the Schumpeterian growth model by Segerstrom (1998) with 
the help of U.S. data. He detects a particularly slow rate of convergence to the BGP: it takes 
almost 40 years to go half the distance to the steady state. Employing a calibrated version of 
our model indicates a half-life of between 28 and 29 years for a wide range of parameter val-
ues.
24 Given these results, it is important to investigate how public policy influences the 
growth rate along the transition path and thereby the level of the balanced-growth path. We 
                                                 
24 More details on the simulation model are available upon request. 
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will show below that a change in γ , which is the parameter that governs the allocation of 
government demand spending, can have far-reaching consequences for the transitional ad-
justment path of the economy. However, before we are able to investigate the effects of 
changes in the composition of public demand on the economy’s transitional dynamics, we 
have to determine stability properties of the BGP. 
 
5. Transitional  Dynamics 
5.1  Local Stability Analysis 
If the value of the relative R&D difficulty, x, by pure chance, took an initial value of 
* x x = , per capita private consumption, c, would immediately jump to its balanced-growth 
value 
* cc =  due to the optimizing behavior of households and the equilibrium conditions (17) 
and (18). The model economy would reach its dynamic equilibrium ab initio and would stay 
there as long as no macroeconomic shock occurred. If 
* x x ≠  initially, it is imperative to in-
vestigate the dynamic movement of the endogenous variables in the model. 
In particular, we want to show that there exists (exactly one or infinitely many) equi-
librium transition path(s) satisfying (5), (9), (17), and (18) for all t that converge to the bal-
anced-growth equilibrium. In other words, we want to determine whether or not the economy 
would be led back to the steady-state equilibrium if it deviated from it at some point in time. 
Studying the dynamical system consisting of the “equations of motion” for  () x t  and  () ct 
gives the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2. Stability of the balanced-growth equilibrium 
Assuming that all industries  [0,1] ω∈  begin with the same relative R&D difficulty  0 (0) x X = , 
the BGP ()
** , cx of the dynamical system under study, given by (22) and (23), is either locally 
saddle-path stable or locally indeterminate, but never instable. 
(i) Local saddle-path stability arises for  crit γ γ < , 






κ μκ μμ ρ κ μ
γ
κμ ρ
⎡⎤ +− ++ − − +− ⎣⎦ =
−Γ
. If so, there exists a unique one-
dimensional stable manifold in () , cx space with the property that trajectories beginning on 
this manifold converge to the steady state ( )
** , c x , while all other trajectories diverge. There-
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 101 26 
fore, the equilibrium-growth path (EGP) will be locally unique in the neighborhood of the 
BGP.  
(ii) Local indeterminacy arises for  crit γ γ > . 
This means that all the trajectories satisfying the laws of motion of the endogenous variables, 
(C.1) and (C.2), and begin in the neighborhood of the BGP ( )
** , c x , converge back to the 
steady state. There is a continuum of equilibrium paths, and the stable manifold has dimen-
sion two. 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
 
Schumpeterian growth models typically exhibit saddle-path stability (e.g., Segerstrom, 
1998; Minniti et al., 2008).
25 The dynamical system approaches its stationary solution (re-
flecting the BGP), given that some boundary conditions (initial and/or final conditions) are 
satisfied. Nonetheless, multiple equilibria existing for a given set of fundamentals is an issue 
that has attracted considerable attention in the last two decades. The possibility of multiple 
equilibria has the potential for explaining business cycles as well as drastically different 
growth experiences of countries whose wealth and endowment levels were similar in the past 
(Benhabib & Farmer, 1999). Especially the latter argument is important from an empirical 
perspective. In the presence of indeterminacy, countries that are initially identically endowed 
may develop along widely different paths with respect to consumption, investment and alloca-
tion of productive factors. The latter is frequently observed in empirical studies, contrasting 
sharply with the robustness of theoretical predictions of Schumpeterian (and other) growth 
models. For this reason, we deem the possibility of indeterminacy that the model provides a 
particularly intriguing result. 
The stability analysis above outlines the region in the parameter space of the demand 
policy parameter γ  for which path multiplicity is consistent with the unique equilibrium posi-
tion of the economy. As noted by Benhabib & Farmer (1994, p. 19), the key to indeterminacy 
is the presence of some sort of market imperfection, e.g., “[…] spillover effects of knowledge 
acquisition.” More recently, Palivos et al. (2003) as well as Hu et al. (2008) developed a 
modified version of Barro’s (1990) seminal model of productive public spending, emphasiz-
ing that government expenditure may play a role in indeterminacy. We find further support 
for this result even without introducing public purchases as a complementary input in private 
production. 
                                                 
25 According to our knowledge, Cozzi (2007) is the only author that has so far accounted for the possibility of 
indeterminacy in Schumpeterian growth models. 
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5.2  Phase Space Analysis 
Having analytically derived the local stability properties of the dynamical system (C.1) 
and (C.2), we want to facilitate the interpretation and understanding of our results by perform-
ing a qualitative phase diagram analysis. To illustrate the dynamics associated with the system 
diagrammatically, we first recall that the ( ) 0 x =   demarcation curve is downward sloping 
in() , cx space and the () 0 c =   demarcation curve is upward sloping (downward sloping) for 
1 κμ +>  () 1 κ μ +<  in () , cx space. The intersection of the two demarcation curves repre-
sents the intertemporal equilibrium of our model economy, ( )
** , cx. At any other point, either 
c or x (or both) would change over time, in directions designated by the signs of the time 
derivatives c  and  x   at that particular point.  
We happen to have  0 x >   to the left of the ( ) 0 x =   demarcation curve and  0 x <   to the 











As we move continually from west to east in the phase space, x   steadily decreases corre-
sponding to an increase in c so that the sign of  x   must pass through three stages, in the order 
0 +− &&. 
Analogously, we use (C.2) to find: 
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From the previous section we can infer that  0 c
x
δ
δ <   ( ) 0 c
x
δ
δ >   for  crit γ γ <  () crit γγ > . A 




  implies that as we move continually from south to north 
in the phase space, c  steadily decreases (increases) corresponding to an increase in x so that 
the sign of c  must pass through three stages, in the order  0 + − && ( ) 0 − + && . 
The complete phase diagram for the case of saddle-path stability is displayed in Figure 2.
26 
                                                 
26 Figure 2 is drawn to depict the case where the ( ) 0 c =   demarcation curve is upward sloping and saddle-path 
stability prevails. In the case of a downward sloping ( ) 0 c =   demarcation curve, Figure 2 must be redrawn with 
the () 0 x =   isocline being steeper than the ( ) 0 c =   isocline. The reason for the latter is easy to comprehend 
when we note that both demarcation curves are never congruent. This would be a contradiction to our result of a 
unique intersection of both curves. However, the ( ) 0 c =   isocline being more steeply downward sloping than 
the  () 0 x =   isocline would require that there exist a value of μ  for which congruency of both curves is al-
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Source:   Own  illustration 
Figure 2:  Saddle-path stability of the balanced-growth equilibrium 
 
The directional arrows in the phase diagram above serve to map out the dynamic 
movement of the system from any conceivable initial point. There exists a unique trajectory 
that leads toward the BGP, denoted by E . Along these stable branches, per capita private 
consumption and relative R&D difficulty strive directly and consistently toward their long-
run values 
* c  and 
* x , given by (22) and (23). For any initial value of the state variable x, the 
control variable c immediately jumps to a value such that the economy is located on the sad-
dle path. This is due to the assumption of rational, forward-looking agents in the economy. If 
the R&D difficulty initially took a value below 
* x , e.g.,  1 x , per capita private consumption 
would instantly jump to  () 1 cx , lying on the saddle path. Subsequently, both variables in-
crease until ()
** , cx is reached. As long as no exogenous shock occurs, c and  x remain at 
their long-run values. Analogously, both variables exhibit a downward movement over time if 
the economy starts at  () 22 , x cx ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦. 
  Notice that the R&D labor share,  () () I Lt L t, is nonconstant along the saddle path. 
From the resource constraint (18), it follows that: 
                                                                                                                                                          
lowed. This can be excluded. Notice further that the slope of the ( ) 0 c =   isocline being positive or negative 




0 = x  0 = c  saddle path

















For starting values  () 11 , x cx ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  left of the intertemporal equilibrium, E ,  () () I Lt L t decreases 
because ( ) ct increases. According to the Keynes-Ramsey rule (5), an increase in  ( ) ct can be 
attributed to the interest rate being higher than the rate of time preference. A relatively high 
interest rate, however, implies that expected R&D revenues are heavily discounted [see (16)], 
which lowers the incentive to invest in respectively employ R&D labor. The same reasoning 
can be used to explain the upward movement of  () () I Lt L t for starting values  () 22 , x cx ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  to 
the right of E . 
 
5.3  The Dynamic Effects of an Increase in γ  
The main result of the paper is derived in this section. We here study how a reshuf-
fling of public demand spending in favor of industries with an above-average quality jump, 
that is, an increase in γ , affects the steady-state properties of our model as well as the transi-
tion toward the new balanced-growth equilibrium. We restrict our attention to the case of sad-
dle-path stability of the BGP. 
  Assume that, initially, the economy rests in the balanced-growth equilibrium 
()
** , cx, denoted by  1 E . Assume further that a permanent and unanticipated increase occurs in 
γ . A look at (C.1) and (C.2) reveals that an increase in γ  causes the ( ) 0 x =   isocline to shift 
rightward and the () 0 c =   isocline to shift upward. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
27 
 
                                                 
27 We again focus on the case of an upward sloping ( ) 0 c =   demarcation curve. As before, all qualitative results 
remain the same for the () 0 c =   demarcation curve being downward sloping. 
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Source:   Own  illustration 
Figure 3:  Dynamic effects of an increase in γ  
 
  To identify the short-run effects of a change in γ , observe first that according to (24) 
the equilibrium R&D labor depends on γ  in a positive manner. Interpreted economically, an 
increase in γ  raises aggregate expected profits from winning an R&D race instantly [see 
(B.4)]. Firms respond by investing more heavily in R&D. Thus, a rise in γ  stimulates R&D, 
leading immediately to a decrease in per capita private consumption, c, because the addi-
tional labor force needed in R&D has to be withdrawn from the manufacturing sector.  
  In the medium run, relative R&D difficulty, x, experiences an upward movement 
caused by the temporarily rising innovation intensity, I  (due to the additional workforce em-
ployed in R&D). By the same token, per capita private consumption, c, increases over time. 
This can be seen from the equation for the interest rate, which, using (17), reads: 
 








κκ μ μ κ μ γ κ
κ
⎡⎤ +− + + − + + Γ ⎣⎦ =−
+
. (27) 
The increase in γ  leads to a temporary upward shift of  () rt above its steady-state level 
* r ρ = . When we argue with the Keynes-Ramsey rule in (5), this implies  () () 0 ct ct >  . The 
intuition behind the increase in the interest rate relates to the stock market where households 
can channel their savings. The stock market valuation of a new quality leader increases due to 









( )new x 0 =  ( )old x 0 = 
γ +Δ
( )new c 0 = 
( )old c 0 = 
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cial markets requires that the expected rate of return from holding a stock of a quality leader 
be equal to the riskless market interest rate that can be obtained through complete diversifica-
tion. However, as x appears in the denominator in (27), the increase in x will eventually 
bring  r  back to its balanced-growth level. An increase in x implies a fall in profitability of 
R&D projects. Firms that want to engage in R&D are thus less willing to pay high rates of 
return for the households’ savings.  
  In the long run, c and x reach their new balanced-growth values 
** cc =  and 
** x x = . 
In the new dynamic equilibrium, denoted by  2 E  in Figure 3, both c and  x have increased 
compared to the situation before the policy change occurred. It is noteworthy that the upward 
movement of per capita private consumption in the new steady state is to be attributed to the 
assumption that the distribution of quality increments in the economy is Pareto. Due to its 
right-skewness, the median of the Pareto distribution is always smaller than its mean. Hence 
the mass of the distribution is on the low-value side. With reference to the model economy, 
this means that there are more industries with quality jumps below rather than above the 
mean. It is straightforward to conclude that the higher the value of γ , the lower is the abso-
lute size of public demand. The tax base needed to finance government demand shrinks ac-
cordingly, leaving private households more resources to be spent for consumption. 
Observe that for  ( ) x t  to rise over time in the transition to the new steady state, (9) im-
plies that the innovation rate in each industry,  ( ) I t , temporarily exceeds its balanced-growth 
value,  ()
* In μ = . Thus, a permanent redistribution of public spending that privileges indus-
tries with a quality jump higher than the economy-wide average generates a temporarily faster 
rate of technological change. The reason why an increase in γ  contributes to a temporary 
acceleration of technological change may be labeled R&D incentive effect. A change in the 
technological composition of public procurement expenditure, privileging more promising 
industries (with respect to the quality increments), causes aggregate expected monopoly prof-
its to increase. This happens because higher quality jumps imply higher markups over mar-
ginal cost and, thus, higher reward for successful innovation activities [see (B.4) and (16)]. 
Innovations are stimulated because firms direct relatively more resources to R&D, which in-
duces a higher demand for R&D labor. The consequence of this increase in the relative size of 
the R&D sector is an acceleration of technological change, and, according to (26), a temporar-
ily faster rate of economic growth. As discussed in Section 4, accelerated growth eventually 
comes to a halt because innovating becomes progressively more difficult over time. 
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  Proposition 3 recapitulates the dynamic effects of an increase in γ . 
 
Proposition 3. Dynamic effects of an increase in γ  
A permanent increase in γ , the parameter that governs the allocation of public procurement 
spending, 
(i) permanently increases per capita private consumer expenditure (c), 
(ii) permanently increases relative R&D difficulty (x), 
(iii) permanently increases share of R&D workers in employment ( / I LL ) ,  
(iv) temporarily increases the rate of technological change (I), 
(v) temporarily increases the rate of utility growth (g), and  
(vi) has no effect on long-run utility growth. 
 
Whether or not our theoretical results are plausible is difficult to evaluate because em-
pirical research on the impact of public demand spending on innovation and growth has been 
poorly represented by the literature. To the best of our knowledge, econometric studies that 
deal with the effects of a change in the technological composition of government procurement 
on economic variables have yet to be conducted. However, empirical work exploring the po-
tential link between public demand spending in general and technological change provides 
some preliminary support for our theoretical findings. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2000) 
use R&D data of 17 OECD countries covering the period 1981-1996 to shed light on the 
question whether public R&D expenditure is complementary or substitutable to business 
R&D. The authors conclude that direct government funding of R&D (including R&D pro-
curement) crowds in privately financed R&D. Lichtenberg (1988) analyzes 169 U.S. manu-
facturing firms in the period 1979-1984. He tests the hypothesis, and estimates the quantity, 
of private investment in “signalling” R&D in order to attract public procurement contracts. 
Lichtenberg finds that the size of government demand can have a large positive impact on 
private R&D expenditure. Saal (2001) investigates whether U.S. military procurement expen-
diture represented an important determinant of growth in total factor productivity in the pe-
riod 1973-1986. The author shows that few manufacturing industries that were directly de-
fense dependent had substantially greater productivity growth than other manufacturing in-
dustries, although in the aggregate this positive effect of procurement-driven technological 
change vanishes. A recent study by Aschhoff & Sofka (2008) uses firm survey data for Ger-
many. Their results indicate that, if public procurement contracts are regarded as important for 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 101 33 
a firm’s innovation activities, these contracts have a positive and significant effect on innova-
tion success (measured as sales with new-to-the-market products).  
  It is clear that neither the level of the BGP nor the magnitude of the growth rate are 
ultimate goals. From a theoretical perspective, the focus should rather be on welfare as the 
key variable of public policy. The next section is thus devoted to the derivation of the social 
optimum where maximum utility is realized. 
 
6. Social  Optimum 
In this section, we explore the model’s properties when a benevolent social planner ex-
ists who is able to allocate all resources in the economy such that welfare of the representative 
family is maximized. We compare the decentralized solution found in Section 4 to the optimal 
solution without public demand. We then solve for the value of the policy parameter, γ , that 
generates the optimal solution in our original model framework. 
The objective function of the social planner is given by (1), which is optimized subject 
to the resource constraint of the economy. The social planner’s control variable is research 
intensity, I , her state variable is relative R&D difficulty, x. To economize space, the optimal 
control problem is set up and solved in Appendix D. We show that there is a unique balanced-
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⎛⎞= ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
. (29) 
Comparing (29) to the R&D labor share in the decentralized economy in (24), it is readily 
established that overinvestment (underinvestment) in R&D compared to the socially optimal 
R&D level occurs if nn n γκμ μ γ ρ Γ+ + Γ>   ( ) nn n γκ μ μγρ Γ++ Γ < .  Ceteris paribus, the 
economy is characterized by an insufficiently low amount of resources directed toward R&D, 
the lower the values of κ , ρ , and μ .  
Raising, or lowering, private R&D expenditure closer to the social optimum is possi-
ble by the appropriate choice of the public demand policy parameter, γ . Hence the govern-
ment can, in principle, increase welfare by adjusting the technological composition of its pur-
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chases. It is straightforward to show that the balanced-growth equilibrium in the decentralized 
economy is optimal for: 









where the value of 
opt γ  lies within the boundaries of zero and one if the condition 
nn n κμ μ ρ Γ+ + Γ≥  holds.
28 A particularly important fact to be noted is that the value of 
opt γ  
is strictly positive. In other words, it is always useful to choose an asymmetric spending rule 
that relatively favors industries with above-average quality jumps to restore efficiency.  
  These welfare results can be understood by looking more closely at the various exter-
nal effects associated with R&D at work in the model (see also Aghion & Howitt, 1992 and 
1998; Segerstrom, 1998).  
First, there is a positive externality called consumer surplus effect. A successful inno-
vation leads to a higher quality of the respective good, whereas consumers still have to pay 
the limit price, λ , for it. This externality continues infinitely into the future, since an innova-
tor who adds the ( 1) j +
th improvement builds upon the knowledge accumulated over the last 
j  improvements, i.e., all later innovations build upon the already higher utility level resulting 
from the most recent innovation. Innovators do not consider this positive impact on consum-
ers’ utility when deciding about the optimal R&D level [see (11)] so that, ceteris paribus, 
R&D efforts are too low under laissez-faire. The social planner takes into account that the 
benefits of the next innovation will last forever. 
Second, each successful innovation generates a business stealing effect. A firm under-
taking R&D investment does not internalize the loss to the previous monopolist caused by an 
innovation. This negative externality also affects the profits of all other industry leaders be-
cause the income loss suffered by shareholders of the displaced firm means less demand and 
thus less profit for the remaining monopolists. According to the business stealing effect, too 
much is, ceteris paribus, invested in R&D compared to the social optimum. The social plan-
ner takes into account that an innovation destroys the social return from the previous innova-
tion. 
Finally, the intertemporal R&D spillover effect associated with research failures repre-
sents a second reason why firms may overinvest in R&D activities from a social perspective. 
Due to our specification of the research technology in (8) and (9), R&D difficulty,  X , is an 
increasing function of the innovation rate, I . The higher the R&D investment in industry ω , 
                                                 
28 Only if the parameter constellation satisfied nn n κ μμ ρ Γ++ Γ = , is the value of 
opt γ  that maximizes 
welfare equal to one. 
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the more difficult it becomes to realize the next innovation in that particular industry. The 
parameter  μ  determines how fast this increase in R&D difficulty takes place. The negative 
externality is further aggravated because more researchers are needed to overcome the de-
creasing research productivity, leaving, ceteris paribus, fewer workers in the manufacturing 
sector. Because the goods market always clears, this goes hand in hand with lower consumer 
demand in equilibrium and with a decrease in profits for the quality leader in each industry 
[0,1] ω∈ . While the increased R&D costs incurred by other firms are ignored in a firm’s 
R&D profit maximization calculus, the social planner takes them into account. 
Identifying these externalities enables us to shed light on the intuition behind the result 
that, ceteris paribus, the amount of resources channeled into R&D is too low from a norma-
tive viewpoint when κ  and μ  are small. In our model, when κ  (the parameter that governs 
the expected size of innovations) is large, new products represent rather “radical” technologi-
cal breakthroughs as quality improvements over existing products are immense. In that case, 
innovative firms are able to charge a relatively high markup of price over marginal cost. Un-
der these circumstances, the negative business stealing effect associated with R&D invest-
ment dominates. In the pursuit of other firms’ profits, an excessive fraction of the economy’s 
resources is devoted to R&D from a social viewpoint. On the other hand, when μ  takes a 
small value, innovation only becomes slightly more difficult over time [see (9)] so the BGP of 
the economy is characterized by innovations occurring frequently. Successfully innovating 
firms earn monopoly profit flows for a relatively short period of time before they are driven 
out of business by further innovation. A small μ  prevailing thus results in a situation where 
the positive consumer surplus effect dominates. Innovating firms benefit only briefly from 
their discoveries, but the benefits to consumers last forever. Under these circumstances, the 
fraction of the economy’s resources directed to R&D is too small. 
Given the normative results of the model, we now refer to the relation between the op-
timal policy intervention, on the one hand, and the average size of innovation or the speed of 
increases in R&D difficulty, on the other hand. First, holding all other parameters fixed, (30) 
implies that the optimal technological composition of public demand, 
opt γ , depends nega-
tively on μ ; the smaller μ , the higher is the welfare-maximizing share of asymmetry in pub-
lic demand spending. As any increase in γ  stimulates private R&D, this finding is in line with 
the interpretation of the welfare result above. Second, in (30) 
opt γ  is a globally decreasing 
function of κ  for parameter values of  1 μ < . For  1 μ > , 
opt γ  increases in κ . There is no un-
ambiguous relationship between the demand policy parameter 
opt γ  and the size of innova-
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tion.
29 Provided the average size of innovation becomes larger, industries with “radical” tech-
nological breakthroughs should be treated (less) favorably with respect to government de-
mand compared to industries with rather “incremental” innovations if the R&D difficulty in 
(9) grows sufficiently fast (slow).  
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have developed a generalized version of a Schumpeterian growth 
model that incorporates a typical trait of real economies, namely the presence of industries 
characterized by different innovation size. This asymmetry causes the distribution of monop-
oly profits from successful innovation to be highly skewed toward the low-value side, with a 
long tail to the high-value side. We use the model to analyze the dynamic effects of a change 
in the technological content of government demand spending.  
Our paper provides some arguments that bring the inter-industrial composition of pub-
lic purchases within the realm of the debate on innovation and growth policy. We find that a 
change in the composition of public demand expenditure that relatively favors industries with 
above-average quality jumps temporarily fosters technological change and economic growth 
due to an R&D incentive effect. A government that channels its demand toward industries 
with a relatively high innovation capacity increases aggregate expected profits. The higher 
reward for successful innovation activities stimulates technological change because firms al-
locate relatively more resources to R&D, thereby inducing a higher demand for R&D labor. 
The model shows that the considerable increase in the wages of skilled workers relative to 
unskilled workers that occurred in U.S. during the 1980s, while at about the same time gov-
ernment procurement expenditure shifted out of low-tech industries and into high-tech indus-
tries, as highlighted recently by Cozzi & Impullitti (2008), was no coincidence. 
We further show that the presence of a public procurement policy that differentiates 
between industries can generate indeterminacy of the balanced-growth equilibrium; i.e., there 
might exist multiple convergence paths that depend on initial conditions, eventually leading to 
the same long-run outcome. This result suggests that government purchasing behavior can be 
one of potentially many factors that explain why different countries with similar initial condi-
tions diverge (temporarily) in their subsequent growth performance. In addition, we find that 
                                                 
29 Previous literature on Schumpeterian growth comes to comparable conclusions, albeit when analyzing policy 
intervention by means of R&D subsidies. Grossman & Helpman (1991) find that private R&D should be subsi-
dized when the size of quality improvements is either very small or very large. Li’s (2003) model basically im-
plies the same U-shaped relation between the optimal subsidy and the size of quality increments.  
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public procurement privileging industries with above-average innovation size unambiguously 
raises welfare above the laissez-faire equilibrium. 
However, drawing policy recommendations from our model should be approached 
with some caution. In this respect, two caveats of the model should be noted. First, due to our 
assumption of full employment of labor in every instant of time, we neglect search unem-
ployment that may come along with the reallocation of labor force from one sector to another 
(Aghion & Howitt, 1994). In a more realistic model setup, the welfare gain resulting from a 
public demand policy relatively in favor of industries with above-average innovation size 
should be offset against the social costs entailed by such asymmetric policy intervention. Sec-
ond, in the real world it may be tolerably difficult for public authorities to identify and also to 
pick “winning industries” (Giordani & Zamparelli, 2008). On the one hand, the assumption 
that the government has the ability to recognize winners is not highly unrealistic provided that 
the distribution of quality increments is indeed time invariant and equivalent to the distribu-
tion of industrial markups. Hall (1988), Roeger (1995), and Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) pre-
sent empirical estimates of industrial markups for U.S. manufacturing industries, providing 
the government with an indication as to the industries where public demand expenditure 
should be directed from the model’s viewpoint. On the other hand, willingness to pick win-
ners may be threatened by the presence of lobbies capable of influencing policy makers’ deci-
sions in their favor and by purchasing conservatism of public authorities. To substantiate the 
latter, a recent survey of the U.K. environmental sector shows that 66 percent of the inter-
viewed companies regarded the procurement process as harmful for their innovativeness as 
tender specifications locked suppliers into traditional technologies (DTI, 2006). In general, 
public sector employees seem to exhibit a substantial degree of risk aversion (Buurman et al., 
2009). 
Bearing in mind these qualifications of the model, we believe our research demon-
strates a substantial degree of policy relevance. Recently, some major initiatives have been 
launched on both the European and the national levels, encouraging public authorities to focus 
their demand on high-tech and innovative solutions (see, e.g., Edler & Georghiou, 2007). We 
see a potential for extending the current analysis to questions concerning the deliberate utili-
zation of public procurement as a tool for innovation policy. One important issue in this re-
spect is to contrast the impact of public procurement on the economy with more “traditional” 
innovation policy instruments, especially R&D subsidies. 
A further aspect not addressed by the paper is the potential importance of government 
purchasing behavior in understanding private production processes. We here refer to a large 
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stream of literature in which publicly provided goods and services are treated as a comple-
mentary input for private production (Arrow & Kurz, 1970; Barro, 1990). Empirical work on 
this topic was stimulated by Aschauer (1989) who stresses that physical infrastructure has the 
most explanatory power for private-sector productivity in the U.S. in the period 1949-1985. 
We believe that accounting for this so-called “productive public spending” in the model pro-
vides a fruitful path for future research. 
Finally, we intend to analyze the empirical plausibility of the model’s predictions. Us-
ing disaggregated U.S. and European procurement data at the industry level, we will subject 
the model to a detailed quantitative assessment. If it survives such an assessment, the model 
could be used to further explore questions about the interactions between public demand, 
technological change and growth. 
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Appendix A: Determining the unique ratio between ε1 and ε2  
In this Appendix, we derive the relation between  1 ε  and  2 ε  for the public demand rule 
to be feasible. By definition,  ()
1
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where ( ) g λ  is the Pareto density function with scale parameter equal to one and share pa-
rameter equal to 1/κ . According to (10), we can express  ( ) g λ  as 
(1 ) 1
κκ κλ
−+ , which allows 
us to rewrite (A.1) as: 
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By definition, the term on the RHS of (A.2) is equal to G . It is now straightforward to show 

















Because the RHS of (A.3) is strictly positive but smaller than one, it follows that  12 ε ε < . 
 
Appendix B: Calculation of the expected profit stream earned by an indus-
try leader 
When we take into account (6), the expected value of the profit flow that accrues to 
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The first term in the integral on the RHS of (B.1) represents the profits an industry leader 
gains from private demand, while the second term captures the profits resulting from govern-
ment purchases. We can substitute for the Pareto density function, ( ) g λ , and for public de-
mand spending,  ( ) G λ , by using (10) and (14). Equation (B.1) becomes: 
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⎩⎭ ∫ . (B.2) 
The term () ()
(1 ) 11
κκ λλ λ
−+ −  can be simplified to ( )
21 1
κ λλ
−− − . Having this in mind, we can 
compute integral (B.2) as being equal to: 
11
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In Appendix A, we showed that there exists a specific relation between  1 ε  and  2 ε , given in 
(A.3). We now make use of this result to eliminate  1 ε . Using (A.3), the integral above boils 
down to: 
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Notice that  ()
1 011 1
κ κ <− − < for all  (0,1) κ ∈ , and thus  ()
1 11 1 1
κ κ ⎡ ⎤ − −> ⎣ ⎦ , leaving the 
term in round brackets on the RHS of (B.3) positive. Rearranging (B.3) eventually allows us 
to write the expected profit stream as: 
  () (, )
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where  () { }
1
2 11 1 1 0
κ εκ ⎡⎤ Γ≡ − − − > ⎣⎦  was defined for notational simplicity and is completely 
determined by parameter values. 
 
Appendix C: Local stability analysis 
To determine stability properties of the balanced-growth equilibrium requires con-
structing a system of two differential equations describing the evolution of the endogenous 
variables out of steady state. Above we defined  () () () x tX t L t ≡ . Taking the logarithm and 
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We use (18) to obtain an expression for the rate of innovation,  ( ) I t . After substituting this 
rate in the equation above, we arrive at a differential equation for  ( ) x t   solely containing  ( ) x t  











⎡⎤ ++Γ −− ⎣⎦ =−
+
 . (C.1) 
The Keynes-Ramsey rule in (5) yields a condition for the evolution of per capita private con-
sumption. However, we have to substitute for interest rate  () rt because it is non-constant over 
time. Solving (17) for  () rt gives us an expression for the interest rate at each instant of time. 
Plugging the respective value of  () rt into (5) yields: 
  ( )() ( ) ( )
()






κμ κμ γ κ μ
ρ
κ
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 , (C.2) 
where we again used the resource constraint (18) to get an expression for  () I t . 
  Equations (C.1) and (C.2) represent a system of two nonlinear, autonomous differen-
tial equations. Notice that the (0 ) x =   isocline is identical to the resource constraint (18) in 
(,) cx space. Thus, it is downward sloping. The (0 ) c =   isocline is upward sloping in (,) cx 
space for (1 ) κμ +>  and downward sloping in (,) cx space for (1 ) κμ +< . However, 
whether the slope of the (0 ) c =   demarcation line is positive or negative has no impact on the 
stability properties of the economy’s BGP.  
  The dynamical system (C.1) and (C.2) is nonlinear. A first order Taylor expansion 
around the steady state, (22) and (23), provides a linear approximation of the system (e.g., 
Acemoglu, 2008, chap. IX). It follows from the Hartman-Grobman theorem and the Sta-
ble/Unstable Maniford theorem (see Lorenz, 1993) that in a sufficiently small neighborhood 
of the balanced-growth equilibrium the linear approximation has the same general stability 
properties as the original nonlinear system. Moreover, the following matrix provides suffi-


















where  J  is the so-called Jacobian matrix, which contains all first partial derivatives of (C.1) 
and (C.2) with respect to the endogenous variables, c and x. For notational convenience, we 
denote the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the balanced-growth equilibrium by  E J  and its ele-
ments by a,b ,c, and d : 
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  dn = − . 
The eigenvalues of  E J , represented by ϑ , are the solutions of the characteristic equation: 
 
2 () ( ) 0 a d ad bc ϑϑ −+ + − = . (C.4) 
These eigenvalues determine the stability properties of the system. If the Jacobian in (C.3) 
does not have an eigenvalue with negative real part, the BGP is unstable. If the Jacobian in 
(C.3) has exactly one eigenvalue with negative real part, the BGP is saddle-path stable. Let-
ting the economy start from any initial value of x, c jumps immediately to the corresponding 
saddle-path value, and over time both x and c converge to their steady-state values given by 
(22) and (23). In other words, in the case of saddle-path stability the equilibrium-growth path 
(hereafter EGP) of  x and c, on which the variables converge to their balanced-growth values, 
is unique. If the Jacobian in (C.3) has two eigenvalues with negative real parts, the BGP is 
fully stable. Irrespective of the initial value of x, both endogenous variables, x and c, will 
eventually approach their steady-state values. Expressed differently, an infinite number of 
EGP exist (indeterminacy). 
At this point we want to determine the sign of the real parts of the eigenvalues of  E J . 
To be able to do so, we make use of the following theorem: 
 
Theorem 1. The number of roots with negative real parts equal two minus the number of sign 
changes in the scheme 
  ( ) ( ) 1 EE Tr J Det J − && 
Proof. This is an application to our special case of the more general Routh-Hurwitz theorem 
(see Gantmacher, 1960). 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 101 50 
 
Recalling that  () E Tr J  is equal to the sum and  ( ) E Det J  is equal to the product of the 
eigenvalues of  E J  (see, e.g., Simon & Blume, 1994, Theorem 23.9), we apply Theorem 1 and 
establish that a necessary and sufficient condition for saddle-path stability is  () E Det J  being 
negative. If  () 0 E Det J > , indeterminacy (instability) arises for  ( ) 0 E Tr J <   () () 0 E Tr J > . 
  The determinant of the Jacobian evaluated at the BGP reads in its general form: 
  ( ) E Det J ad bc = − . 
After some simplifications, we arrive at: 
()
() ( ) () ( ) { }
()






κμ μ ρ μ ρ κγ κ κμ μκ μγ μ
κκ μγ
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The sign of  () E Det J  depends critically on the parameter γ . It is straightforward to show that 
() 0 E Det J <  if  crit γ γ <  and  () 0 E Det J >  if  crit γ γ > , where: 
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. (C.5) 
We used above our necessary-and-sufficient condition for the existence of a balanced-growth 
equilibrium, namely  1 G < . Notice that in the following we impose that the parameter values 
always satisfy the restriction: 
  () ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 Gn G μρ κ κ κ μ μ κ μ μ ⎡ ⎤ + +Γ − ≤ + − + + +Γ − − ⎣ ⎦ , (C.6) 
which ensures that  [0,1] crit γ ∈ . We conclude from the preceding discussion that the balanced-
growth equilibrium, given by (22) and (23), is locally saddle-path stable for values of γ  be-
low  crit γ .  
In order to investigate the stability properties of our dynamical system for values of γ  
above  crit γ , we consider now the trace of the Jacobian in (C.3). We use (C.5) to substitute for 
γ  in the equation for the trace. More precisely, we add an (infinitesimal small) number 
χ
++ ∈ℜ  to the RHS of (C.5), and plug it into the expression for the trace. By doing so we 
make sure that we are in the parameter range of a positive  ( ) E Det J . Some major cancellation 
occurs, and we get: 
() () ()( ) ( ) ( )( )
() () () ( ) {}
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Making use of (C.6), one can show after some tedious algebra that  ( ) E Tr J  is always nega-
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tive, provided that both eigenvalues of  E J  are of the same sign, i.e.,  () 0 E Det J > . It follows 
that both eigenvalues of  E J  must be negative, if  crit γ γ > , indicating the existence of multiple 
EGP that eventually approach the BGP (local indeterminacy).  
 
Appendix D: Social optimum 
This Appendix considers the social optimum. First, we observe that production of each 
vintage of consumption goods in industry  [0,1] ω∈  requires the same technology. Hence it 
cannot be optimal to produce consumption goods at a lower quality level than state-of-the-art 
quality. When only goods at the current quality frontier are produced in each industry, subutil-
ity (2) becomes: 





log ( ) log ( , ) , ,
jt ut td j t d
ω λ ωω ω ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ ∫ , (D.1) 
where  ()
max , j t ω  denotes the highest quality level in industry ω  at time t. Equation (D.1) 







log ( ) log ( , ) log , ,
jt ut t d d j t d
ω λ ωω ωω ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ∫∫ . 
To see that the social planner will choose the same R&D intensity  X  in each industry, ob-
serve that the quantity of each state-of-the-art product consumed by an individual equals: 













+ ∫ . (D.2) 
For given resources devoted to R&D at time t,  ()
1
0 ,( ) I Lt L t d ω ω ∫ , the social planner wants 
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= ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ∫∫ , 
where the probability density function  ( ) g λ  is Pareto and equal to 
(1 ) 1
κκ κλ
−+ . Solving the 






j td I d ω ωω τ τ = ∫∫ ∫ , gives: 














λ ωω κ ω
ω
⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ ∫∫ , (D.3) 
where we used (8) to substitute for  ( ) , I t ω .  
  Equation (D.3) implies that at each point in time, the social planner wants to carry out 
all R&D in industries with the lowest  ( ) , X t ω . Executing this policy throughout time will 
lead to  () ,( ) X tX t ω =  and  () ,( ) I tI t ω =  for all t (at some point in time all industry-specific 
R&D difficulties are equalized). 
  We define now  ( ) ( ) I tt φ ≡   so that with  X  and I  not varying across industries, the 






















We plug this expression into the discounted utility function (1), while noting that  ( )
nt Lt e =  
















−− ⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞
=+ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦ ∫ . (D.4) 
The social planner maximizes  ( ) Ut given in (D.4) with respect to the control variable  ( ) I t , 
subject to the state equation  ( ) ( ) tI t φ =   and the control constraint 0( ) / ( ) I tA x t ≤ ≤ . The RHS 
of the latter inequality results from (8), at the point where  I LL = . 
  As shown in Segerstrom (1998), this maximization problem can be reformulated using 
() x t  instead of  () t φ  as state variable. By solving 
()
0 ()
tn t x tX e e
μφ =  for  () t φ  and plugging 
the resulting expression into (D.4), the dynamic optimization problem the social planner 















−− ⎡+ − ⎤ ⎛⎞ +− ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ∫  
 s.t.   
                                                 
30 Notice that the time argument of functions is dropped in the remainder of this Appendix for the sake of nota-
tional convenience. 










 (state equation),  
  0 (0) 0 xX = >  (given), and 





≤≤ (control constraint). 
Dropping the constant term 
() 0
0







⎝⎠ ∫ , the current-value Hamiltonian for the 
social planner’s problem is: 
  () log log 1
Ix





⎛⎞ =+ − + − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
, (D.5) 
with ξ  denoting the costate variable associated with the state variable x.  
  For the application of Pontryagin’s maximum principle, the Hamiltonian has to be 
concave in its control variable I  (Chiang & Wainwright 2005, chap. 20), which is indeed the 
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 . (II) 
The transversality condition reads: 
 
() lim ( ) ( ) 0
nt
t ex t t
ρ ξ
−−
→∞ = . (III) 
We solve (I) for I  and substitute the resulting expression into (II), which yields an equation 
of motion for the state variable ξ . Again solving (I) for I  and plugging the resulting value 
into the state equation, we obtain a differential equation that governs the evolution of relative 
R&D difficulty, x. 
  The resulting two-dimensional system of nonlinear, autonomous differential equations 






=− +  , (D.6) 
 
1
xA n x μ
ξ
= −−  . (D.7) 
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In the balanced-growth equilibrium, (I) implies that  0 x ξ = =   . The ( ) 0 x =   isocline is upward 
sloping and the () 0 ξ =   isocline is downward sloping in ( ) , x ξ  space. There is a unique inter-
section of both curves in the positive orthand of ( ) , x ξ  space, giving rise to the following bal-


















Stability inferences of the BGP can be made by setting up the “maximized Hamiltonian“, 
which is obtained when we substitute the value of I  derived from (I) into the Hamiltonian 
(D.5). According to Proposition 10 in Arrow & Kurz (1970) respectively Theorem 7.14 in 
Acemoglu (2008), if the maximized Hamiltonian is a strictly concave function of the state 
variable  x for any given ξ , jumping onto the saddle path at time  0 t =  and staying on the 
saddle path until the BGP is reached represents an optimal path for the economy. It is easy to 
show that in our case the second-order derivative of the maximized Hamiltonian is strictly 
negative. Thus, we can establish that the unique BGP resulting from solving the social plan-
ner’s optimal control problem is saddle-path stable. 
  The socially optimal research intensity is the same as in the decentralized case, which 
can be seen when setting the state equation equal to its balanced-growth value,  0 x =  . This 
gives equation (30) in the main text. Further, the socially optimal R&D labor share (equation 
(31) in the main text) can be calculated by substituting 
opt x  for x in  I LLn x A μ = . 
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